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ABSTRACT 
The Effect of 
Remuneration Committee 
on Directors’ Remuneration in Hong Kong 
 
 
by 
 
 
WONG Shuk Fong Ada 
 
 
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
 
According to the Code on Corporate Governance Practices (CG Code), listed firms should be 
overseen by a board of directors that promotes the success of the firm through effective 
direction and supervision of the listed firm’s affairs.  Remuneration paid to directors should 
be sufficient to attract and retain directors of a caliber required to run the company 
successfully, but companies should avoid paying more than is necessary.  The board should 
appoint a remuneration committee consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors 
and chaired by a non-executive director.  The role of the committee is to make 
recommendations to the board on executive director remuneration in all of its forms, drawing 
on outside advice as necessary.  According to the CG Code, the committee should consult 
with the chairman of the board and/or chief executive officer regarding its proposals relating 
to the remuneration of other executive directors.  However, as many listed firms in Hong 
Kong are majority-owned by individuals and their families, the positions of the chairman 
and/or chief executive officer are usually held by family members who can influence the 
level of remuneration paid to directors.  In an effort to assess how well the CG Code works, 
this study examines whether directors’ remuneration is influenced by independent 
non-executive directors where the chairman of the board is a family member.  Findings 
show that since the introduction the CG Code, where the number of independent 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee is high, the committee acts as means 
of control, which leads to lower directors’ remuneration than in situations where family 
members have more influence on remuneration committee decisions. 
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Introduction 
Corporate governance refers to “the systems by which companies are directed and 
controlled, including the institutional arrangements for boardroom pay setting.” (Conyon, 
Gregg & Machin, 1995, p.710)  In the wake of the financial scandals of the early 2000s, 
there has been increased focus on quality of earnings and the responsibility of corporate 
executives for earnings (Carter, Lynch & Zechman, 2005).  The way in which a 
remuneration system is designed reflects a firm’s corporate governance and the extent to 
which it applies free market principles.  Executive remuneration has long been a topic of 
heated debate and the focus of much research in the U.S. and other developed economies 
(Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Core et al., 1999; Conyon & Murphy, 2000; Bebchuk & Fried, 
2006).  Good corporate governance can help prevent excessive pay for top management 
and encourages the use of performance-related pay schemes (Cheng & Firth, 2006). 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine directors’ remuneration in Hong Kong’s listed 
firms. Hong Kong is representative of economies in which the firms are mainly 
family-controlled.  A distinctive characteristic of such firms is that a high percentage of 
their shares are held by the CEOs and directors; in addition, such firms are often 
family-owned.  In such firms, families are capable of expropriating wealth from the firm 
through excessive remuneration, related-party transactions, or special dividends (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2003).  Hence, the focus of this paper is on determining the differences, if any, 
between family-owned firms (FOFs) and non-family-owned firms (NFOFs) with 
institutional ownership with respect to directors’ remuneration.   
 
Various studies come to different conclusions about the performance of FOFs relative to that 
of other firms.  To some extent, this is because they use the term “family-owned firms” 
differently.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) refer to any firm with a dominant shareholder as a 
2 
 
family-owned firm.  By this definition, Microsoft is a family-owned firm, even though Bill 
Gates has given no notice of any clear intention to pass control on to his sons or daughters.  
Likewise, their definition would catch Andrew Carnegie’s turn of the century Carnegie Steel 
as a family-owned firm, even though he ultimately sold out and gave the $480 million he 
received away to charities.  Indeed, Carnegie’s famous maxim “A man who dies rich dies 
disgraced” would be incomprehensible to the ruling families of multigenerational European 
family businesses (Morck & Yeung, 2004). 
 
This study examines large family firms – firms big enough to be listed.  I define family 
firm as a listed firm with at least one director of the board who deemed to be substantial 
shareholder.  Substantial shareholder is defined by referring to Section 336 of Part XV of 
the Securities and Futures Ordinance, individuals and corporations who are interested in 5% 
or more of any class of voting shares in a listed corporation is deemed to be substantial 
shareholders. 
 
I set out to investigate whether there is a link between the excessive compensation levels 
awarded to directors if the chairman and/or CEO are family members of substantial 
shareholders.  Also explored is the issue of how independent non-executive directors 
influence directors’ remuneration to maximize company wealth and protect shareholders’ 
interests, especially those of minority and non-family shareholders. 
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The Regulatory Background in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong company law and corporate governance regulations are based on the British 
legal system (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998).  Hong Kong retains the 
British model of the joint stock company, the basic architecture of which presumes that a 
broad base of owners delegates management of the enterprise to a smaller number of 
directors (Brewer, 1997).   
 
The Code on Corporate Governance Practices (CG Code), Appendix 14, which forms part of 
the Listing Rules issued by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx), came into 
effect on 1 January 2005.  The CG Code deals with corporate governance issues including 
the protection of shareholder rights in voting and share transactions, directors and board 
practices, and corporate reporting and disclosure.  The CG Code places an onus on the 
board of directors to present balanced, clear and understandable annual and interim reports. 
 
According to the Code, Hong Kong’s listed firms should be overseen by an effective board, 
which should assume responsibility for the leadership and control of the listed firm and the 
members of which should be collectively responsible for promoting the success of the firm 
by directing and supervising its affairs.  Directors should make decisions objectively in the 
best interests of the firm.  To encourage directors to fulfill these responsibilities, 
incentive-based remuneration is needed to influence executive actions in ways that affect 
financial reporting (Healy, 1985).   
 
Listing Rule 3.10 requires that the board of directors of a listed issuer have at least three 
independent non-executive directors, which implies that the appointment of independent 
non-executive directors is a basic requirement and important element of the board.  The 
independence of proposed non-executive directors can be assessed in accordance with 
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Listing Rule 3.13.  First, such proposed directors should hold no more than 1% of the total 
issued share capital of the listed issuer.   Second, they should not receive an interest in any 
securities of the listed issuer by way of a gift, or by means of any other form of financial 
assistance, from a connected person or the listed issuer itself.  Third, they should not act as 
a director, partner or principal of any professional adviser who currently provides or has 
provided services within one year immediately prior to the date of their proposed 
appointment, or be an employee of any such professional adviser who is or has been 
involved in providing such services during the same period.  Fourth, they should not have a 
material interest in any principal business activity of or be involved in any material business 
dealing with the listed issuer or any of its related parties.  Fifth, they should not be 
nominated for appointment to the board specifically to protect the interests of any entity the 
interests of which are not the same as those of the shareholders as a whole.  Sixth, they 
should not have been connected with any director, the chief executive or any substantial 
shareholder of the listed issuer for two years immediately prior to the date of their proposed 
appointment.  Seventh, they should not have acted as an executive or director of the listed 
issuer or any of its related parties at any time during the two years immediately prior to the 
date of their proposed appointment.  Finally, they should not be financially dependent on 
the listed issuer or any of its related parties. 
 
According to the CG Code, information related to the firm’s directors’ remuneration policy 
and other remuneration-related matters should be disclosed.  There should be a formal and 
transparent procedure for setting policy on executive directors’ remuneration and fixing the 
remuneration packages of all directors.  Remuneration should be set at a level sufficient to 
attract and retain directors of the caliber required to run the company successfully, but 
companies should avoid paying more than is necessary. 
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One criticism of this arrangement is that directors with substantial shareholdings can use 
their voting power to award themselves large and unwarranted remuneration packages. 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996)  However, this may not be the case in Hong Kong, as the 
CG Code states that no director should be involved in determining his or her own 
remuneration. 
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Disclosure of Remuneration 
In 1994, HKEx introduced rules that require listed firms to disclose additional information 
pertaining to top management pay in their annual reports.  Firms must disclose the number 
of directors who receive remuneration in various pay bands: HK$0 – 1,000,000, 
HK$1,000,001 – 1,500,000 and upwards in increments of HK$500,000 for each band.  The 
remuneration packages of the firm’s five highest paid employees, including its directors, 
must be disclosed and broken down according to the number of employees in each band.  
Until 2004, there was no requirement to disclose the names of directors whose remuneration 
fell within each pay band, meaning that the packages of individual executive directors 
remained private (Cheng & Firth, 2005). 
 
The Disclosure of Financial Information rule (Appendix 16, paragraph 24) under HKEx’s 
Listing Rules was amended from 31 March 2004.  It states that directors’ fees and any 
other reimbursement or emolument payable to a director must be disclosed in full in the 
annual report and accounts of the issuer on an individual and named basis, as follows: 
(1) Directors’ fees for the financial year; 
(2) Directors’ basic salaries, housing allowances, other allowances, and benefits in kind;  
(3) Contributions to pension schemes for directors or past directors for the financial year; 
(4) Bonuses paid or receivable by directors that are discretionary or are based on the listed 
issuer’s, the group’s or any member of the group’s performance for the financial year; 
(5) Amounts paid during the financial year or receivable by directors as an inducement to 
join or upon joining the listed issuer; and  
(6) Remuneration paid during the financial year or receivable by directors or past directors 
for the loss of office as a director of any member of the group or of any other office in 
connection with the management of the affairs of any member of the group, 
distinguishing between contractual and other payments. 
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Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standard (HKFRS) 2 requires listed firms to disclose 
directors’ share-based remuneration.  The fair value of share options granted to directors is 
recognized as an expense in the company’s consolidated income statement or as an asset if 
the cost qualifies for recognition as an asset under the company’s accounting policies.  Any 
corresponding increase is recognized as a capital reserve within equity.  Fair value is 
measured at the grant date using an option pricing model such as the Black-Scholes or 
binomial model, taking into account the terms and conditions upon which the options were 
granted.  Where the directors have to meet vesting conditions before becoming 
unconditionally entitled to options, the total estimated fair value of the share options is 
spread over the vesting period, taking into account the probability that the options will vest. 
 
During the vesting period, the number of share options that are expected to vest is reviewed. 
Any adjustment to the cumulative fair value recognized in prior years is charged / credited 
to the consolidated profit and loss account for the year of the review unless the original 
directors’ expenses qualify for recognition as an asset, with a corresponding adjustment 
being made to the capital reserve.  On the vesting date, the amount recognized as an 
expense is adjusted to reflect the actual number of options that vest (with a corresponding 
adjustment to the capital reserve) other than where forfeiture is due solely as a result of a 
failure to satisfy vesting conditions that relate to the market price of the company’s shares.  
The equity amount is recognized in the capital reserve until the option either is exercised 
(when it is transferred to the share premium account) or expires (when it is released directly 
to revenue reserves). 
 
Greater disclosure of executive compensation makes it possible to identify the specific 
remuneration packages paid to specific individuals or for specific job roles, thus allowing 
for more detailed examination of directors’ remuneration. 
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Motivation 
In the wake of the financial scandals of the early 2000s, there has been increased focus on 
quality of earnings and the responsibility of corporate executives for earnings (Carter, 
Lynch & Zechman, 2005).  Lemmon and Lins (2003) examine whether differences in 
ownership structure at the firm level can explain differences in firm performance during the 
East Asian financial crisis that began in July 1997.  The East Asian crisis offers an 
interesting opportunity to study the valuation effects of ownership structure that avoids 
some of the potential shortcomings of prior research (Lemmon & Lins, 2003).  As a result, 
the focus of this study is on the pre-crisis period during 2006 and 2007; just before the 2008 
global financial crisis. 
 
Empirical research into the determinants of top executive remuneration has found that there 
is only a very weak statistical link between directors’ remuneration (excluding 
shareholdings and options) and the stock market performance of their companies (see Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990, for evidence from the United States; and Gregg, Machin & Szymanski, 
1993a, for evidence from the United Kingdom).  Hence, this study does not focus on the 
link between directors’ remuneration and firm performance.  I will study the effectiveness 
of CG Code regarding directors’ remuneration which is different from prior research. 
 
The rise in executive pay over time has been the subject of much public criticism, which 
further intensified following the corporate governance scandals that began erupting in late 
2001 (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006).  Boards have long been considered to play an important 
role in setting executive pay (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  However, executive 
directors should play no part in decisions regarding their own remuneration (Cadbury, 
1992).   
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Consistent with the findings of previous studies, the CG Code states that boards should 
appoint remuneration committees that consist wholly or mainly of independent 
non-executive directors and that they should make recommendations to the board on 
directors’ remuneration in all its forms, drawing on outside advice as necessary.  The 
underlying principle of the CG Code is that a company’s directors should play no part in 
determining their own pay.   
 
To examine whether this principle is borne out in practice, the study reported in this paper 
assessed the empirical relationship between boards of directors, remuneration committees 
and directors’ pay.  To ascertain how effective the CG Code is, this study examines 
whether directors’ remuneration is influenced by the two following variables: the 
appointment of independent non-executive directors and whether the chairman of the board 
or CEO of an FOF is a member of the controlling family.  In addition, the size, 
performance and monitoring of listed firms in Hong Kong during 2006 and 2007 will be 
controlled for. 
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Incentive effects vary with different forms of remuneration (Holmstrom, 1979; Shavell, 
1979), and public fund managers have often voiced the opinion that managerial 
remuneration should be linked to corporate performance (Smith, 1996; Gillan & Starks, 
2000).  Hence, firms should formulate remuneration contracts in a way that is likely to 
maximize firm value by promoting the achievement reported earnings objectives (Healy, 
1985; Sloan, 1993; Holthausen et al., 1995).   
 
Board Structure 
The board is expected to represent the shareholders and serves as their first line of defense 
against a self-serving management team.  The problem with corporate internal control 
systems start with the board of directors.  The board, at the apex of the internal control 
system, has the final responsibility for the functioning of the firm (Jensen, 1993).  
Monitoring of corporate boards by independent non-executive directors suggests that 
corporate boards will become more responsive to investors, and inclusion of independent 
non-executive directors on boards will improve the firm’s compliance with disclosure 
requirements which in turn will enhance the comprehensiveness and quality of disclosures 
(Chen & Jaggi, 2000).  An important question relating to board composition concerns the 
ideal combination of outside and inside members.  While outsiders (independent 
non-executive directors) are more independent than insiders (executive directors and 
non-executive directors) of a firm’s CEO, they are potentially less informed regarding firm 
projects.  Insiders may face distorted incentives due to their lack of independence from the 
firm’s CEO (Bushman et al., 2004). 
 
Listing Rule 3.10 requires that the board of directors of a listed issuer have at least three 
independent non-executive directors, which implies that the appointment of independent 
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non-executive directors is a basic requirement and important element of the board. 
 
Remuneration Committees 
Corporate boards of directors provide a source of external control over management 
decisions that could be self-serving; thus it is expected that members of the board 
discourage excessive top management compensation and at least attempt to link that 
compensation in some manner to company performance (Cheng & Firth, 2005).  The 
external control can be extended with the majority of remuneration committee members be 
independent non-executive directors.  This study is to empirically evaluate how this can 
influence the remuneration pay to the board. 
 
In the 1980s, inclusion of independent non-executive directors on corporate boards started 
to receive increasing attention.  Two main arguments have been advanced in support of 
independent non-executive directors.  First, independent non-executive directors provide 
advice to corporate boards on strategic decisions, which may improve the firm’s economic 
and financial performance.  The second argument for inclusion of independent 
non-executive directors on corporate boards relates to better monitoring of management 
decisions and activities by corporate boards (Chen & Jaggi, 2000).   
 
The board of directors’ function is to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.  
Boards can either conduct their work through the full board or, subject to the articles of 
incorporation, through a majority vote in order to delegate their authority to standing 
committees responsible to the board.  Board committees meet separately from the full 
board, and are composed of subsets of board members.  In addition, board committees tend 
to have specific, narrowly defined functions (Klein, 1998). 
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The CG Code recommends that board committees should be formed with specific written 
terms of reference which deal clearly with the committees’ authority and duties.  Issuers 
should establish audit and remuneration committees as required by CG Code.  Issuers may 
establish nomination or other governance committees as best practice. 
 
In 1999, remuneration committees were uncommon in Hong Kong, with only a few firms 
reporting their existence (Cheng & Firth, 2005).  Studies of firms in other countries yield 
conflicting results on the relationship between pay and remuneration committee: some find 
that remuneration committees reduce remuneration, whereas others report the opposite 
(Conyon & Peck, 1998; Ezzamel & Watson, 1998).   
 
Although regulatory intervention is commonly supported, it is debatable whether recent 
reforms have sufficiently strengthened directors’ independence and fully addressed past 
problems.  In light of recent regulatory reforms, one would expect boards to have 
established pay policies that protect the interests of shareholders (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006) 
and, in support of this expectation, that Hong Kong listed firms would have established 
remuneration committees with specific written terms of reference clearly specifying their 
powers and duties. 
 
The CG Code recommends that the majority of remuneration committee members be 
independent non-executive directors.  Remuneration committees should make 
recommendations to the board on the issuer’s policy and structure for all forms of 
remuneration paid to directors and senior management and on the establishment of a formal 
and transparent procedure for developing policy on such remuneration.  Independent 
non-executive directors, who are motivated to take their duties seriously due to the need to 
maintain their reputations in the labor market, are unlikely to countenance excessive 
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executive director remuneration. One function of independent non-executive directors is to 
strengthen the monitoring of the firm’s management through good corporate governance.  
The presence of independent non-executive directors on the remuneration committee can be 
used as monitoring mechanism (Basu et al., 2007) that prevents excessive remuneration for 
executive directors.  Hence, the following hypothesis is tested. 
Hypothesis 1: All other things being equal, lower directors’ remuneration will be associated 
with higher proportion of independent non-executive directors for the remuneration 
committee. 
 
Powers of Family Members 
Companies in many countries have controlling shareholders – either wealthy families or 
other firms that, themselves, are controlled by wealthy families. This means that the 
managers of most firms in most countries serve at the pleasure of a wealthy family, not at 
the pleasure of public shareholders (Morck & Yeung, 2004). 
 
Cheng and Firth (2005, 2006) found that within a family firm environment, the direct 
compensation paid to top managers would tend to be reduced if the directors had substantial 
stockholdings.  Research into corporate governance within a family controlled 
environment is nevertheless quite rare (Chen & Lee 2008).  However, given that Hong 
Kong represents an economy within which firms are mainly family controlled, I will study 
the whole remuneration package to the board if the chairman or CEO had substantial 
stockholdings over 5% as a proxy for the definition of a family controlled firm. 
 
Many listed firms are majority owned by individuals and their family members, a 
phenomenon that has implications for corporate governance, firm performance and the 
setting of senior executive pay (La Porta et al., 1999; Lawton & Tyler, 2001; Mishra et al., 
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2001).  The difference between FOFs and NFOFs is that the ownership is held by different 
person.  FOFs (NFOFs) refer to those firms with (without) family ownership or family 
presence on the board of directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2003).  FOFs are majority-owned by 
individuals and their families, the positions of the chairman and/or chief executive officer 
are usually held by family members who can influence the level of remuneration paid to 
directors.  NFOFs are owned by shareholders who are not related to the family or executive 
directors.  The advantages of maintaining founding family control include the provision of 
stability and long-term planning and sustainability.  In addition, family ownership often 
allows for flexibility and timeliness in decision making.  Hong Kong is a good 
representative of economies in which the firms are mainly family-controlled. 
 
For the identification of FOFs, prior research provides only limited guidance on how to 
ascertain FOFs.  Ownership structure in many Hong Kong companies is characterized by 
the dominance of one primary owner.  This dominant owner holds a percentage of shares 
significant enough to be the largest shareholder but usually much less than the majority 
holdings of a company (Chau & Leung, 2006).  In order to clearly define FOFs from 
NFOFs, I classify a firm as FOFs if: (i) a family member serves as a director of the Board; 
and (ii) any director own more than 5% of the firm’s equity.   
 
Refer to Section 336 of Part XV of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, individuals and 
corporations who are interested in 5% or more of any class of voting shares in a listed 
corporation deem to be substantial shareholders.  Chau & Leung (2006) start their analysis 
with three levels of ownership: less than 5%, between 5% and 25% and more than 25%.  
Base on these information, I conduct tests with cut-off point at 5%, if any director with 
shareholding more than 5% of the issued shares, then I will identify this firm as FOF.  I use 
the dummy variable coded one (1) if the chairman of the board or CEO is a member of the 
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family that controls the company and holds more than 5% of the total issued shares.   
 
Family traits, including trust, altruism and paternalism, can encourage an atmosphere of 
commitment to and love for the business (James, 1999).  However, the management 
structure of such firms is often autocratic, leading to the concern that some controlling 
shareholders might treat their companies as personal fiefdoms (Bond, 1996; Brewer, 1997).  
Such companies may lack corporate transparency, especially in directors’ remuneration.  
Directors who have substantial shareholdings are likely to receive lower compensation.  
First, such directors will receive large dividend payouts, reducing their need for cash 
compensation.  Second, tax minimization may be an objective when remuneration is set.  
Notwithstanding the expropriation of assets argument, it is contended that directors who 
have substantial shareholdings will be associated with lower direct remuneration (Deckop, 
1988; Ramaswamy et al., 2000) designed to reduce their salary tax obligations.  In my 
experience, this may not necessarily be the case; in Hong Kong, which is a low tax region in 
comparison with other territories and countries such as the USA, chairmen and/or CEOs 
may use their powers to award themselves generous remuneration packages, either 
individually or on a firm basis.  Chairmen and/or CEOs with bargaining power can be 
expected to influence the size and structure of their remuneration packages to their own 
benefit (Ryan & Wiggins, 2004). 
 
The CG Code also recommends that the remuneration committee consult with the chairman 
and/or CEO before making a suggestion on the remuneration of other executive directors.  
In addition, the remuneration committee should have access to professional advice on 
directors’ remuneration if it is considered necessary.  Management ownership and family 
control can be used as ownership mechanisms (Basu et al., 2007).  Hence, the following 
hypothesis is tested. 
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Hypothesis 2: All other things being equal, higher directors’ remuneration will be 
associated with firms in which the chairman of the board or CEO of the firm is a member of 
the family that controls the company and holds more than 5% of the total issued shares. 
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Data Collection 
This study used data of firms listed on HKEx.  Directors’ information, remuneration 
payment and board composition were collected manually from annual reports.  Sales, stock 
returns, returns on equity, sales growth and leverage data were collected from Datastream. 
 
Sample Selection 
Because the CG Code came into effect in 2005, most firms should have had remuneration 
committees by the 2006 fiscal year-end.  Therefore, the sample selection process started 
with a population of all firms listed on the main board in 2006.  Table 1 shows the 
procedure used to select the final sample.  Observations were eliminated if firms were 
missing price or other data needed for regression estimation.  Firms involved in takeovers 
or mergers, or which were subsequently withdrawn or suspended from the main board, were 
also excluded, as were newly listed firms and those for which the closing date or their 
financial statements changed during the observation period. 
 
In addition, companies that were classified as foreign, H share or red chip firms were not 
included because their financial profiles are significantly different from other companies; 
including them in the dataset would have led to meaningless or spurious results.  HKEx 
defines a foreign company as a company that is incorporated overseas and does the majority 
of its business outside Hong Kong and mainland China.  An H share is a company 
incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) with shares issued under PRC law 
and listed on HKEx, the par value of which is denominated in RMB, and which are 
subscribed for and traded in HKD.  A company is deemed to be a mainland 
China-controlled company (red chip) if: 1) the company has a total of at least 30% of its 
shares held directly by mainland China entities and/or through companies that are controlled 
by mainland China entities; or 2) the company has a total of between 20% and 30% of its 
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shares held directly by mainland China entities and/or through companies that are controlled 
by mainland China entities, and such entities have a strong influence, viewed from a 
subjective basis, on the company’s board of directors. 
 
This study focuses on 10 industry groups based on the HKEx classification system: 
Conglomerates, Consumer Goods, Energy, Industry, Information Technology, Materials, 
Property and Construction, Services, Telecommunications and Utilities.  Financial 
industries such as insurance and banking are excluded because their financial profiles are 
different from those of other industries.  The selection process for firms resulted in a final 
sample of 968 firm-year observations (484 firms) across 10 industries in 2006 and 2007.  
While there were a total of 9,142 director observations for 2006 and 2007, 1,687 were 
excluded because of appointment, resignation, removal, re-designation, retirement, or death 
during 2006 or 2007.  The selection process for directors yielded a final sample of 7,455 
individual firm-year observations. 
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Research methodology 
Previous Research 
The purpose of Cheng and Firth (2005) study is to examine top management pay in Hong 
Kong and to investigate how it is affected by firms’ ownership and governance 
characteristics.  Cheng and Firth (2005) also investigate the role of institutional ownership 
and board composition in the determination of pay.  Cheng and Firth (2005) find that 
director and institutional ownership moderate remuneration but that there is little evidence 
that they encourage pay-for-performance reward schemes.  With similar idea, this study 
will follow the research model of Cheng and Firth (2005), as follows: 
 
Directors’ Pay = β0 + β1 Log of Sales + β2 Return on Equity + β3 Stock Return + β4 
Sales Growth + β5 Group + β6 Leverage + β7 % Directors’ Share 
Ownership + β8 % Institutional Share Ownership + β9 % 
Non-executive Directors + εj, 
Where: 
Directors’ Pay = log of the average pay of the executive directors 
Log of Sales = log of sales revenues (in millions) for the fiscal year 
Return on Equity = net income divided by average shareholders’ equity 
Stock Return = annual return (price change plus dividend) for the 
fiscal year 
Sales growth = yearly proportional change in sales 
Group = dummy variable coded one (1) if the company was 
part of a “group” controlled by one family 
Leverage = debt divided by shareholders’ equity 
% Directors’ share ownership = the number of shares owned by the directors divided 
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by the number of outstanding shares 
% Institutional share ownership = the number of shares held by institutions (equal to or 
greater than the disclosure level of 10%) divided by 
the number of outstanding shares 
% Non-executive directors = the number of non-executive directors divided by the 
total number of directors on the board 
 
Cheng and Firth (2005) used the above model for observations from 1994 to 1999.  
However, because the observations used in the present study are for 2006 and 2007, i.e., 
after the CG Code with its different disclosure requirements came into force, the model is 
amended as follows. 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable used in Cheng and Firth’s (2005) study was average executive 
directors’ remuneration (total remuneration of executive directors divided by the number of 
executive directors).  As the board of directors works as a group, this study used total pay 
of all board directors to obtain an overall picture of firms in Hong Kong.  To mitigate the 
impact of outliers, I followed the common practice (e.g. Conyon & Peck, 1998) of using the 
logarithms of the average pay among all directors in a company. 
 
Directors’ pay can be delineated as three separate components: salary, annual performance 
bonus, and the change in the value of share options held.  Salary is a fixed form of 
remuneration and is normally paid without challenge.  On the contrary, bonus is a 
short-term variable component of pay which is linked to some element of accounting profits 
generally over a one year period.  Share option is a long-term component of pay and it 
grants the holder a right to purchase a specific number of shares within a definite time 
21 
 
period at a prearranged price.  A director’s increase in wealth derived from holding share 
options is dependent on the variation in share price and the number of options granted and 
exercised (McKnight & Tomkins, 2004). 
 
Directors’ pay structures can be found in annual report.  As the Disclosure of Financial 
Information rule (Appendix 16, paragraph 24) under HKEx’s Listing Rules states that 
directors’ fees and any other reimbursement or emolument payable to a director must be 
disclosed in full in the annual report and accounts of the issuer on an individual and named 
basis.  Directors’ fees can be set to ensure directors receive sufficient payment for the work 
with board.  Salaries can be set to ensure directors received sufficient payment if he or she 
also holds the post of executive.  Pensions can act as a long-term protection to attract 
director work in long run.  Bonus can act as an attraction for directors to run the business 
successfully.  Share base payments can attract directors to work not just for the firm, but 
also for themselves as shareholders.     
 
Independent Variables Used to Test the Hypotheses 
The ownership and governance variables that Cheng and Firth (2005) used to test their 
hypotheses were the share ownership of directors expressed as a percentage of the total 
issued shares, the share ownership of institutions and blockholders (who are not directors or 
allied to the directors) expressed as a percentage of the total issued shares and the number of 
non-executive directors on the board expressed as a proportion of the total number of 
directors. 
 
However, since the introduction of the CG Code, directors’ remuneration has been 
determined by a remuneration committee after consultation with the chairman or CEO of the 
board.  I thus replaced the three independent variables used in Cheng and Firth’s (2005) 
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study with two variables: the number of independent non-executive directors divided by the 
total number of directors on the remuneration committee, and whether or not the chairman 
or CEO of an FOF was a member of the controlling family. 
 
Control Variables 
Following Cheng and Firth (2005), this study includes the following control variables that 
could affect the level of remuneration: company size (log of sales), performance (return on 
equity, stock return, and sales growth) and monitoring (leverage). 
 
In Cheng and Firth’s (2005) study, a group of listed companies controlled by a single 
individual or family was captured as an indicator variable, “Group”.  However, given that 
most FOFs are chaired by family members, the problem of multicollinearity arises due to 
the high correlation between the “Group” and “Family Head” variables.  Many possible 
values can be assigned to their coefficients.  In other words, their coefficients cannot be 
estimated precisely and their standard errors would be large.  To solve this problem, the 
“Group” variable was dropped from the model. 
 
The Adjusted Model Used in this Study 
After taking into consideration all of the issues stated above, the following model was 
developed, with industry and year dummies being included in the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression.  I have estimated the statistical significance using White standard errors 
to adjust for any potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the data. 
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Directors’ Pay = β0 + β1 INED on RC + β2 Family Head + β3 Log of Sales + β4 Return 
on Equity + β5 Stock Return + β6 Sales Growth + β7 Leverage + εj (1) 
Where: 
Directors’ Pay = log of the remuneration of all directors in each firm; 
INED on RC  = the number of independent non-executive directors 
divided by the total number of directors on the 
remuneration committee 
Family Head = dummy variable coded one (1) if the chairman of the 
board or CEO is a member of the family that controls 
the company and holds more than 5% of the total 
issued shares 
Log of Sales = log of sales revenues (in millions) for the fiscal year 
Return on Equity = net income divided by average shareholders’ equity 
Stock Return = the annual return (price change plus dividend) for the 
fiscal year 
Sales Growth = the yearly proportional change in sales 
Leverage = debt divided by shareholders’ equity 
 
Equation (1) concerns the total amount paid to all directors for each firm.  The 
remuneration received by an individual director may differ according to whether the director 
is a family member, the chairman of the board, the CEO of the firm, an independent 
non-executive director, or a member of the remuneration committee.  Therefore, a second 
model with additional dummy variables included in the OLS regression was developed to 
consider the remuneration paid to individual directors. 
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Directors’ Pay = β0 + β1 INED on RC + β2 Family Head + β3 Log of Sales + β4 Return on 
Equity + β5 Stock Return + β6 Sales Growth + β7 Leverage + β8 Family 
Member + β9 Chairman + β10 CEO + β11 INED + β12 RC + εj (2) 
Where: 
Directors’ Pay = log of the remuneration of individual directors in each 
firm 
Family Member = dummy variable coded one (1) if the director of the 
board is a member of the family that controls the 
company and holds more than 5% of the total issued 
shares 
Chairman = dummy variable coded one (1) if the director is the 
chairman of the board 
CEO = dummy variable coded one (1) if the director is the 
CEO of the firm 
INED = dummy variable coded one (1) if the director is an 
independent non-executive director 
RC = dummy variable coded one (1) if the director is a 
member of the remuneration committee 
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Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows that since the introduction of the CG Code, which requires that the majority 
of remuneration committee members be independent non-executive directors, the percentage 
of remuneration committee members who are independent non-executive directors has been 
approximately 73%.  In approximately 83% of firms, the board of directors includes a 
director who is a member of the family that controls the company and holds more than 5% 
of the total issued shares.  This result supports my observation that most companies in 
Hong Kong are FOFs.  In approximately 79% of firms, the post of chairman of the board 
or CEO is held by a member of the family that controls the firm.  This result supports the 
view that most FOFs allow their family members to hold these senior positions. 
 
Correlation Analysis 
The use of remuneration paid to all directors resulted in the problem of multicollinearity.  
As most FOFs are headed by a family member, the “Group” and “Family Head” variables 
are highly correlated, with the highest absolute correlation (0.86) shown in panel A of Table 
3.  The second highest absolute correlation (0.83) is between directors’ bonuses and sales, 
which suggests that when sales are high, all directors received larger bonuses. 
 
The same problem arises in the case of remuneration paid to individual directors.  The 
“Group” and “Family Head” variables are again highly correlated, with the highest absolute 
correlation (0.87) shown in panel B of Table 3.  The second highest absolute correlation 
(0.61) is again between directors’ bonuses and sales, which suggests that when sales are 
high, individual directors receive larger bonuses. 
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Regression Analysis 
Table 4 shows the regression results when directors’ remuneration is related to various 
potential determinants.  The focus was on whether the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee or a family member being the 
chairman or CEO of an FOF influences directors’ pay.   
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the regression results for the dependent variables of different 
types of remuneration and total payment to all directors.  The independent variables have 
incremental explanatory power for total payment (R2 = 43.2%).  Regarding different types 
of remuneration, the independent variables have the highest incremental explanatory power 
for bonus (R2 = 36.3%) and the lowest incremental explanatory power for directors’ fees (R2 
= 23.1%).  
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the regression results for the dependent variable of different types 
of remuneration and total payment to each individual director.  The independent variables 
have incremental explanatory power for total payment (R2 = 45.3%).  Regarding different 
types of remuneration, the independent variables have the highest incremental explanatory 
power for basic salaries and others (R2 = 43.2%) and the lowest incremental explanatory 
power for directors’ fees (R2 = 16.1%).   
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that, as expected, the percentage of independent non-executive 
directors on the remuneration committee had negative coefficients for different types of 
remuneration and total payment on a firm basis, other than for share-based payments.  The 
results support Hypothesis 1.  Directors receive less remuneration when the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the remuneration committee is higher.  This 
suggests that independent non-executive directors can control the emolument paid to all 
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directors.   
 
It appears that independent non-executive directors do not support higher pay for all 
directors, as the regression results for directors’ fees, basic salaries and others were 
statistically significant (the p-values were 0.004 for directors’ fees and 0.011 for salaries, 
lower than the significance level of 0.05).  However, the regression results for pension 
contributions and bonuses were not statistically significant (the p-values were 0.108 for 
pensions and 0.158 for bonuses, greater than the significance level of 0.05).  These results 
suggest that independent non-executive directors cannot control share-based payments made 
to all directors, with a coefficient that was unexpectedly positive and statistically significant 
(the p-value was 0.010, lower than the significance level of 0.05). 
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that, as expected, the percentage of independent non-executive 
directors on the remuneration committee had negative coefficients for both basic salaries 
and others and pension contributions on an individual basis.  These results supported 
Hypothesis 1.  Directors receive lower basic salaries and pensions when the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the remuneration committee is higher, which 
suggests that independent non-executive directors can control the salaries and pensions paid 
to individual directors.  Independent non-executive directors do not appear to support 
higher salaries and pensions for individual directors, as the regression results for these items 
were statistically significant (the p-values were 0.012 for salaries and 0.000 for pensions, 
lower than the significance level of 0.05). 
 
Unexpectedly positive regression coefficients for directors’ fees, bonuses, share-based 
payments and total remuneration to individual directors indicate that the percentage of 
independent non-executive directors on the remuneration committee does not affect the 
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level of these forms of remuneration.  However, with the exception of share-based 
payment, the regression results are not statistically significant (the p-values range from 
0.116 to 0.814, greater than the significance level of 0.10).   
 
The regression results show that on both a firm and an individual basis, there is a significant 
positive relationship between the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the 
remuneration committee and share-based payments (the p-values are 0.010 for firms and 
0.000 for individuals, lower than the significance level of 0.05).  This indicates that 
directors receive higher share-based payments when the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee is higher. 
 
The CG Code states that the remuneration committee can seek advice from the chairman or 
CEO on the matter of directors’ pay.  Hence, this study will also consider whether or not a 
family member being the chairman or CEO of an FOF will influence directors’ pay.  This 
variable has positive coefficients for salaries, bonuses, and total payment on a firm basis 
(panel A, Table 4).  The results support Hypothesis 2 and are statistically significant (the 
p-values range from 0.001 to 0.058, lower than the significance level of 0.10).  As 
expected, I find that director remuneration is, on average, higher for FOFs in which 
chairman or CEO is a family member than for NFOFs after controlling for the economic 
determinants of directors’ pay. 
 
Regarding payments made on an individual basis, the positive coefficient only applied to 
salaries, bonuses and total payment, but not at a statistically significant level (the p-values 
ranged from 0.184 to 0.786, greater than the significance level of 0.10).  I find no support 
for hypothesis 2 on an individual basis.   
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Base on the result on firm basis, this suggests that when the chairman or CEO of an FOF is a 
member of the family that has control over the firm (via a shareholding of greater than 5%), 
he or she can influence remuneration committee decisions to increase remuneration for all 
directors.  Ideally, directors’ remuneration contracts should be formulated and approved by 
the remuneration committee, which acts on behalf of the shareholders.  These results 
indicate that a substantial family shareholding influences directors’ remuneration contracts, 
an arrangement that may not favor all shareholders. 
 
Company size (log of sales) is by far the major determinant of different types of 
remuneration and total directors’ pay at both the firm and individual levels (the p-value is 
0.0000 for all types of payments to directors other than share-based payments on firm level, 
for which the p-value was 0.011, lower than the significance level of 0.05 and the smallest 
among the p-values for all variables).  These results suggest that directors’ remuneration 
will be higher in large firms, because large firms are usually more complex and require 
more skilled and experienced directors. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 shows that among the performance variables, executive pay on a firm 
basis is much less sensitive to performance than has been commonly recognized.  The 
p-value of return on equity (0.745) is less significant than that of stock return (0.078) in 
terms of total remuneration paid, which indicates that accounting performance is less 
significant than stock performance.  Sales growth had a negative relationship with total pay 
and different types of remuneration on a firm basis, and is significant in the regression result 
(the p-values range from 0.000 to 0.038).  The two exceptions are share-based payments, 
which had a significant positive relationship with sales growth, and salary payments, which 
had an insignificant negative relationship with sales growth.  The negative sign for sales 
growth is as predicted by John and John (1993).  Leverage (with p-values ranging from 
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0.000 to 0.094) had a positive relationship with the different forms of remuneration for all 
directors other than fee and bonus payments, and is significant at the 10% confidence level 
for all forms of remuneration other than share-based payments.  Cheng and Firth (2005) 
also found that leverage had a positive sign.   
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the result for executive pay on an individual basis is different 
from that for executive pay on a firm basis: return on equity has a significant negative 
relation with total remuneration payment (p-value 0.003), but an insignificant positive 
relation with payment on a firm basis.  This suggests that even among listed firms that are 
not performing well, individual directors are still generously remunerated.  There is a 
positive relationship between stock return (p-value 0.050) and total remuneration paid, 
indicating that individual directors are paid more when stock performance is good.   
 
Sales growth has a negative relationship with salaries and pensions and bonuses on an 
individual basis; the results other than for salaries are significant at the 5% confidence level 
(the p-values were 0.023 for pensions and 0.000 for bonuses).  Leverage (for which the 
p-values range from 0.007 to 0.022) has a positive and significant relationship with salary, 
pension, and total payments for individual directors. 
 
The view that better designed directors’ remuneration arrangements can generally improve 
firm performance was supported only by the positive coefficient on stock return.  Other 
variables, including return on equity and sales growth, have negative coefficients.  Thus, 
Hong Kong listed firms’ arrangements for directors’ remuneration may not improve even if 
firm performance improves. 
 
Stock return had a positive relationship with directors’ pay, which suggests that in 
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well-performing listed firms (in terms of stock price increases), directors are rewarded, as 
they are responsible for the firm’s success.  However, in poorly performing listed firms, 
shareholders will vote with their feet by selling their shares, leading to a decrease in the 
stock price, and directors being punished through lower pay. 
 
Based on the regression results, the main variables that determine directors’ pay are sales 
and sales growth.  Firms with higher sales, which are normally large firms, will pay higher 
emoluments to all directors.  Sales are a good predictor of variability in directors’ 
remuneration, and remuneration contracts provide an incentive to directors to expand the 
size of the firm at the expense of profits.  This is consistent with the traditionally accepted 
objective of expanding a firm to maximize shareholder value (Deckop, 1988).  My results 
clearly demonstrate that in the firms sampled, directors were not given an incentive to 
increase sales growth, as the relationship between their remuneration and sales growth was 
negative.   
 
The first variable of interest in this study is the influence of the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee on directors’ remuneration.  The 
sign of the coefficient for this variable is the same as that predicted for directors’ fees, 
salaries, and total remuneration on a firm basis, and is statistically significant.  Regarding 
payment on an individual basis, the sign for this variable is the same as that predicted for 
salaries and pensions, and the p-value is statistically significant.  These results suggest that 
as the level of remuneration committee independence increases, directors are less likely to 
receive generous remuneration packages.  Independent non-executive directors are 
encouraged to monitor on behalf of shareholders. 
 
The second variable of interest is whether or not a member of the controlling family is 
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chairman or CEO.  The sign of the coefficient for this variable was the same as that 
predicted for salaries, bonuses, and total payment on a firm basis, and is statistically 
significant.  These results suggest that chairmen and CEOs use their position to influence 
directors’ remuneration.  Regarding payment on an individual basis, this variable had a 
positive coefficient for salaries, bonuses and total payment, but is not statistically 
significant. 
 
Panel B of Table 4 shows that for directors’ payments on an individual basis, there is a 
significant positive coefficient for family members in terms of total remuneration.  This 
suggests that any director of the board whose family members control the company (as 
measured by a holding of more than 5% of the total issued shares) will receive more 
remuneration than non-family members.  The results support the view that the 
concentration of management power in the hands of a controlling family gives a significant 
amount of power to that family and enables it to take action that is beneficial to the family.  
When a family is a substantial shareholder in a firm, family members have an incentive to 
overpay themselves. 
 
There is a significant positive coefficient for chairmen in terms of directors’ fees, salaries, 
bonuses, and total remuneration at the 1% confidence level.  This suggests that chairmen of 
the board receive more remuneration than their fellow directors. There was a significant 
positive coefficient for CEOs in terms of salaries, pensions, bonuses, share-based payments, 
and total remuneration at the 1% confidence level.  This suggests that any director who 
holds the post of CEO will receive more remuneration than his fellow directors.  These 
results, while not surprising, are evidence that chairmen and CEOs use their power to award 
themselves higher pay. 
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Finally, the results showed that independent non-executive directors received high directors’ 
fees than executive directors but lower salaries, pensions, share-based payments, and total 
remuneration.  Directors who are remuneration committee members receive higher 
directors’ fees, bonuses and total remuneration than those who are not. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The first regression analysis (see Table 4) is conducted using all variables as the main test.  
The other models shown in Table 5 are tested alternately without the control variables of 
stock return, return on equity, or industry and year dummies.  The results are consistent 
with those of the main test. 
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Conclusion 
The study reported here found that the introduction of the CG Code in Hong Kong operated 
as an effective form of control on listed firms and protected shareholders’ interests with 
respect to directors’ remuneration on both a firm and individual basis.  Family control 
influences the use of shareholders’ funds, with the results showing that greater amounts are 
paid out to directors of FOFs on both a firm basis.  Remuneration committees may lack 
sufficient incentives to focus solely on shareholders’ interests when they set directors’ pay 
levels.  Hence, the CG Code may not adequately protect minority shareholders, as the 
results are not significant for firms in which a majority of remuneration committee members 
are independent non-executive directors.  Directors of firms with a chairman or CEO who 
is a member of the controlling family may receive higher remuneration, as the CG Code 
allows the remuneration committee to seek advice from the chairman or CEO in 
determining directors’ remuneration.  This is indicated by the significant positive 
coefficient for payment on a firm basis when the chairman or CEO is classified as a 
controlling family member. 
 
Board monitoring, measured in terms of the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on a remuneration committee, has only a limited effect on the level of directors’ 
pay.  Even when the majority of remuneration committee members are independent 
non-executive directors, as required by the CG Code, the independence of these directors 
remains open to question.  Although legal constraints suggest that they should act in an 
independent manner, in that they cannot be a relative of any of the executive directors of or 
shareholders in the listed firm, friendships between the independent non-executive directors 
and substantial family shareholders of a listed company may lead to a lack of independence.   
 
Based on the regression results obtained, the chairman or CEO being a member of the 
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family that controls a listed firm significantly influences the remuneration decisions made 
by independent non-executive directors.  Listed firms may thus have an opportunity to pay 
out more to their directors as a whole, and even if independent non-executive directors 
comprise the majority of the remuneration committee, the committee might not be a perfect 
external monitor in terms of directors’ pay.   
 
Findings of this study suggest that there is a conflict in the CG Code regarding directors’ 
remuneration.  CG Code requires issuers to form remuneration committee with higher 
proportion of independent non-executive directors.  This requirement is aimed at 
enhancing shareholders’ interest protection.  However, CG Code recommends the 
remuneration committee consult the chairman and/or CEO before making a suggestion on 
the remuneration of other executive directors.  Base on the result of this study, I found that 
directors will get more remuneration if the chairman and/or CEO are classified as family 
member; suggesting that such a requirement is not an effective measure in shareholders’ 
interest protection.  On the other hand, a more practical recommendation to be included in 
the CG Code could be a requirement of the remuneration committee to compose of a 
professionally qualified member in human resource management.  Membership of the 
Hong Kong Institute of Human Resource Management or the equivalent can be used as a 
guideline. 
 
One limitation of this study is the time constraint: the observations only include listed firms 
in 10 industries during 2006 and 2007.  This may have led to a failure to identify a robust 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and the percentage of independent 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee, or whether the chairman or CEO is 
a member of the controlling family.  Therefore, more observations should be collected in 
future research to cover a longer period following the introduction of the CG Code.  
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Especially the recent financial crisis in 2008 may lead to a different result. 
 
This study mainly examines directors’ emoluments with control variables related to firm 
performance over a short period to ascertain how they influence directors’ pay.  However, 
when a director is nominated to the board of a firm, the appointment is not confined to a 
short period and the director will normally seek to improve performance over the long term. 
 
This suggests that emoluments are used to reward directors for improvements in accounting 
performance, and that such rewards will not be given for short-term fluctuations, but rather 
for improvements made over a considerable period of time.  Therefore, the model used in 
this study may not reflect the long-term objectives adopted by many firms and directors.  
As such, research in this area would be improved by lengthening the observation period. 
 
The Disclosure of Financial Information rule (Appendix 16) under the HKEx Listing Rules 
was amended to require that directors’ fees be disclosed in full on an individual and named 
basis in the firm’s annual report.  However, listed firms are run not only by their directors, 
but also by other executives, and executive remuneration can be an important factor in a 
firm’s corporate governance.  Hence, future studies should also use as a dependent variable 
the highest paid director or top manager who is not a director (Hartzell and Starks, 2003).  
 
One further limitation of this study is its narrow focus on the question of incentives alone, 
based on internal firm factors.  However, directors can receive “luck-based” pay: that is, 
pay associated with profit increases that are generated entirely by external factors (e.g., 
changes in oil prices, GDP, inflation, exchange rates and so forth) and not associated with 
their own efforts.  Therefore, control variables that take into account external factors may 
be needed in future research.
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Criterion 
Number of 
Distinct 
Firms 
Number of Companies Listed on Main Board as at 31 December 2006 975 
LESS: Firms with missing price or data 168 
LESS: Withdrawal of listed companies afterwards 12 
LESS: Companies under suspension afterwards 3 
LESS: Companies takeover and merger afterwards 1 
LESS: Foreign Companies 8 
LESS: H shares Companies 95 
LESS: Red Chip Companies 80 
LESS: Newly Listed Companies during 2006 39 
LESS: Companies change accounts closing date 11 
LESS: Companies classify as Financial Industry 74 
FINAL SAMPLE 484 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Remuneration of All Directors 
  Mean Range Minimum Median Maximum SD 
1 Director Pay (HK$’000)       
1a Directors’ Fees 789.784 20,400.000 0.000 482.000 20,400.000 1,098.990 
1b Basic Salaries & Others 7,391.336 93,160.000 0.000 5,091.442 93,160.000 8,450.673 
1c Pension Contributions 260.786 9,300.000 0.000 54.000 9,300.000 712.664 
1d Bonuses 3,499.882 280,700.000 0.000 0.000 280,700.000 14,076.061 
1e Share-based Paid 2,345.399 681,823.564 0.000 0.000 681,800.000 23,359.860 
1f Total 14,291.961 721,100.000 0.000 7382.660 721,100.000 31,992.360 
2 INED on RC 0.734 1.000 0.000 0.667 1.000 0.145 
3 Family Head  0.785 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.411 
4 Sales (HK$ millions) 2,717.637 218,726. 000 0.000 684.738 218,726. 000 11,080.126 
5 Return On Equity -0.460 528.552 -489.691 0.095 38.860 15.800 
6 Stock Return 1.230 568.634 -0.883 0.195 567.751 18.337 
7 Sales Growth 0.529 143.938 -1.000 0.105 142.938 4.989 
8 Leverage 0.527 76.711 -8.237 0.234 68.474 2.453 
9 Group 0.833 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.373 
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Panel B: Remuneration of Individual Director 
  Mean Range Minimum Median Maximum SD 
1 Director Pay (HK$’000)       
1a Directors’ Fees 143.817 19,199.000 1.000 100.000 19,200.000 323.731 
1b Basic Salaries & Others 1,914.484 31, 535.000 5.000 1,282.900 31,540.000 2,298.134 
1c Pension Contributions 86.098 3,149.000 1.000 12.000 3,150.000 213.525 
1d Bonuses 2,177.005 136,018.000 2.000 605.500 136,020.000 6,215.509 
1e Share-based Paid 1,804.193 220,398.000 2.000 236.000 220,400.000 12,161.460 
1f Total 1,703.427 240,500.000 0.000 250.000 240,500.000 6,356.380 
2 INED on RC 0.724 0.667 0.333 0.667 1.000 0.137 
3 Family Head  0.789 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.408 
4 Sales (HK$ millions) 3,816.357 218,726.000 0.000 873.090 218,726.000 14,319.262 
5 Return On Equity -0.250 528.552 -489.691 0.109 38.860 12.729 
6 Stock Return 0.932 568.634 -0.883 0.198 567.751 14.795 
7 Sales Growth 0.523 143.938 -1.000 0.108 142.938 5.514 
8 Leverage 0.588 76.711 -8.237 0.236 68.474 3.309 
9 Group 0.832 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.374 
10 Family Member 0.248 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.432 
11 Chairman 0.122 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.328 
12 CEO 0.115 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.319 
13 INED 0.374 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.484 
14 RC 0.436 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.496 
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
Panel A: Remuneration of All Directors 
  1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Director Pay (HK$’000s)              
1a Directors’ Fees 1             
1b Basic Salaries & Others 0.23 1            
1c Pension Contributions 0.25 0.65 1           
1d Bonuses 0.16 0.46 0.50 1          
1e Share-based Paid 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.02 1         
1f Total 0.27 0.58 0.50 0.59 0.78 1        
2 INED on RC -0.01 -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 -0.06 1       
3 Family Head  -0.09 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 1      
4 Sales (HK$ millions) 0.20 0.36 0.43 0.83 0.07 0.53 -0.06 -0.03 1     
5 Return On Equity 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 1    
6 Stock Return (HK$) -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 1   
7 Sales Growth -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1  
8 Leverage 0.04 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.00 1 
9 Group -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.86 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 
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Panel B: Remuneration of Individual Director 
  1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Director Pay (HK$’000s)                   
1a Directors’ Fees 1                  
1b Basic Salaries & Others 0.05 1                 
1c Pension Contributions 0.00 0.55 1                
1d Bonuses 0.06 0.36 0.39 1               
1e Share-based Paid 0.12 0.28 0.19 0.07 1              
1f Total 0.08 0.55 0.44 0.63 0.95 1             
2 INED on RC 0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 1            
3 Family Head  -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.15 -0.04 -0.07 1           
4 Sales (HK$ millions) 0.04 0.23 0.39 0.61 0.28 0.24 -0.06 -0.04 1          
5 Return On Equity 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1         
6 Stock Return (HK$) 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 1        
7 Sales Growth 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1       
8 Leverage 0.02 0.11 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1      
9 Group -0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -0.05 0.87 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 1     
10 Family Member 0.02 0.11 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.26 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.26 1    
11 Chairman 0.11 0.18 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.45 1   
12 CEO 0.04 0.26 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.21 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.29 1  
13 INED -0.01 -0.17 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.19 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.44 -0.27 -0.28 1 
14 RC 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.19 -0.03 -0.02 0.61 
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Table 4: Regression Analysis 
 Panel A: Remuneration of All Directors 
Variable Directors’ Fees  
Basic Salaries & 
Others  
Pension 
Contributions  Bonuses  Share-based Paid  Total 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.522 0.004 ***  -0.504 0.011 **  -0.417 0.108   -0.787 0.158   1.736 0.010 **  -0.357 0.087 * 
Family Head  -0.213 0.000 ***  0.242 0.002 ***  -0.265 0.008 ***  0.305 0.058 *  -0.435 0.086 *  0.200 0.015 ** 
Log Sales 0.200 0.000 ***  0.300 0.000 ***  0.427 0.000 ***  0.577 0.000 ***  0.167 0.011 **  0.375 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.001 0.000 ***  -0.000 0.360   -0.000 0.962   0.399 0.127   0.017 0.155   0.000 0.745  
Stock Return -0.000 0.860   0.001 0.006 ***  0.026 0.147   0.010 0.785   0.121 0.019 **  0.000 0.078 * 
Sales Growth -0.004 0.038 **  -0.025 0.381   -0.062 0.017 **  -0.134 0.000 ***  0.035 0.058 *  -0.021 0.000 *** 
Leverage -0.002 0.809   0.019 0.000 ***  0.024 0.001 ***  -0.005 0.606   0.002 0.897   0.010 0.094 * 
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
R-squared 0.231  0.350  0.359  0.363  0.232  0.432 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217  0.338  0.346  0.338  0.184  0.422 
N 948  935  885  453  292  965 
 
Notes: 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.  
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Panel B: Remuneration of Individual Director 
Variable 
Directors’ Fees  Basic Salaries & Others  Pension Contributions  Bonuses  Share-based Paid  Total 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC 0.030 0.756   -0.466 0.000 ***  -0.610 0.000 ***  0.071 0.814   1.608 0.000 ***  0.162 0.116  
Family Head  -0.125 0.000 ***  0.013 0.786   -0.347 0.000 ***  0.126 0.184   -0.509 0.000 ***  0.054 0.200  
Log Sales 0.140 0.000 ***  0.220 0.000 ***  0.323 0.000 ***  0.499 0.000 ***  0.123 0.000 ***  0.225 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.001 0.000 ***  -0.001 0.433   0.000 0.648   0.626 0.001 ***  0.044 0.011 **  -0.001 0.003 *** 
Stock Return 0.001 0.030 **  0.001 0.248   0.027 0.003 ***  0.012 0.586   0.046 0.070 *  0.001 0.050 ** 
Sales Growth 0.005 0.008 ***  -0.012 0.202   -0.027 0.023 **  -0.144 0.000 ***  0.044 0.003 ***  0.006 0.046 ** 
Leverage 0.002 0.217   0.009 0.007 ***  0.011 0.022 **  -0.022 0.196   -0.001 0.931   0.016 0.007 *** 
Family Member -0.178 0.001 ***  0.088 0.020 **  0.021 0.680   -0.096 0.259   -0.156 0.267   0.147 0.005 *** 
Chairman 0.388 0.000 ***  0.339 0.000 ***  -0.042 0.511   0.613 0.000 ***  0.265 0.130   0.504 0.000 *** 
CEO 0.080 0.346   0.616 0.000 ***  0.302 0.000 ***  0.679 0.000 ***  0.599 0.000 ***  1.263 0.000 *** 
INED 0.333 0.000 ***  -2.501 0.000 ***  -1.162 0.000 ***  -0.41 0.109   -1.161 0.000 ***  -1.621 0.000 *** 
RC 0.192 0.000 ***  0.062 0.147   -0.089 0.131   0.289 0.003 ***  0.167 0.197   0.116 0.003 *** 
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
R-squared 0.161  0.432  0.285  0.360  0.325  0.453 
Adjusted R-squared 0.157  0.428  0.279  0.350  0.310  0.451 
N 4795  3465  2738  1488  1051  7055 
Notes: White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Table 5: Sensitive Analysis 
 Panel A1: Directors’ Fees of All Directors 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.522 0.004 ***  -0.523 0.004 ***  -0.523 0.004 ***  -0.522 0.004 ***  -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  -0.213 0.001 ***  -0.301 0.018 **  -0.213 0.001 ***  -0.213 0.001 ***  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.200 0.000 ***  0.201 0.000 ***  0.200 0.000 ***  0.200 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.001 0.000 ***  -0.001 0.000 ***      -0.001 0.000 ***      -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return -0.000 0.860   -0.000 0.540   -0.000 0.848           0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.004 0.038 **  -0.004 0.036 **  -0.004 0.038 **  -0.004 0.038 **  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage -0.002 0.809   -0.002 0.828   -0.002 0.801   -0.002 0.809   0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     0.110 0.432                  
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.231  0.232  0.231  0.231  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.217  0.217  0.218  0.218  0.614  0.424 
N 948  948  948  948  136  499 
 
Notes: 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel A2: Directors’ Fees of Individual Director 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC 0.030 0.756   0.033 0.736   0.030 0.760   0.034 0.729   -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  -0.125 0.000 ***  -0.036 0.533   -0.125 0.000 ***  -0.127 0.000 ***  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.140 0.000 ***  0.139 0.000 ***  0.140 0.000 ***  0.140 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.001 0.000 ***  -0.001 0.000 ***      -0.001 0.000 ***      -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.001 0.030 **  0.001 0.010 **  0.001 0.031 **          0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth 0.005 0.008 ***  0.005 0.008 ***  0.005 0.009 ***  0.005 0.009 ***  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.002 0.217   0.002 0.271   0.002 0.236   0.002 0.215   0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     -0.115 0.069 *                 
Family Member -0.178 0.001 ***  -0.173 0.001 ***  -0.178 0.001 ***  -0.178 0.001 ***         
Chairman 0.388 0.000 ***  0.388 0.000 ***  0.388 0.000 ***  0.388 0.000 ***         
CEO 0.080 0.346   0.077 0.363   0.080 0.346   0.080 0.347          
INED 0.333 0.000 ***  0.333 0.000 ***  0.333 0.000 ***  0.333 0.000 ***         
RC 0.192 0.000 ***  0.192 0.000 ***  0.192 0.000 ***  0.192 0.000 ***         
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.161  0.162  0.161  0.161  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.157  0.158  0.157  0.157  0.614  0.424 
N 4795  4795  4795  4795  0.614  0.424 
Notes: White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel B1: Basic Salaries & Others of All Directors 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.504 0.011 **  -0.506 0.010 ***  -0.504 0.011 **  -0.500 0.012 **  -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  0.242 0.002 ***  0.398 0.008 ***  0.242 0.002 ***  0.240 0.002 ***  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.300 0.000 ***  0.298 0.000 ***  0.300 0.000 ***  0.300 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.000 0.360   -0.000 0.378       -0.000 0.370       -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.001 0.006 ***  0.001 0.005 ***  0.001 0.007 ***          0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.025 0.381   -0.024 0.402   -0.025 0.381   -0.025 0.381   -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.019 0.000 ***  0.019 0.000 ***  0.020 0.000 ***  0.019 0.000 ***  0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     -0.201 0.234                  
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.350  0.352  0.350  0.350  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.338  0.339  0.339  0.339  0.614  0.424 
N 935  935  935  935  136  499 
 
Notes: 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel B2: Basic Salaries & Others of Individual Director 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.466 0.000 ***  -0.463 0.000 ***  -0.467 0.000 ***  -0.464 0.000 ***  -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  0.013 0.786   0.183 0.069 *  0.013 0.782   0.011 0.813   -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.220 0.000 ***  0.218 0.000 ***  0.220 0.000 ***  0.220 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.001 0.433   -0.001 0.434       -0.001 0.435       -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.001 0.248   0.001 0.096 *  0.001 0.250           0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.012 0.202   -0.012 0.219   -0.012 0.201   -0.012 0.202   -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.009 0.007 ***  0.009 0.009 ***  0.009 0.007 ***  0.009 0.007 ***  0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     -0.221 0.037 **                 
Family Member 0.088 0.020 **  0.098 0.009 ***  0.088 0.021 **  0.088 0.020 **         
Chairman 0.339 0.000 ***  0.333 0.000 ***  0.339 0.000 ***  0.339 0.000 ***         
CEO 0.616 0.000 ***  0.614 0.000 ***  0.616 0.000 ***  0.617 0.000 ***         
INED -2.501 0.000 ***  -2.492 0.000 ***  -2.501 0.000 ***  -2.501 0.000 ***         
RC 0.062 0.147   0.062 0.146   0.062 0.148   0.062 0.148          
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.432  0.433  0.432  0.432  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.428  0.429  0.428  0.428  0.614  0.424 
N 3465  3465  3465  3465  0.614  0.424 
Notes: White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel C1: Pension Contributions of All Directors 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.417 0.108   -0.408 0.118   -0.417 0.108   -0.416 0.109   -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  -0.265 0.008 ***  -0.406 0.004 ***  -0.265 0.008 ***  -0.266 0.008 ***  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.427 0.000 ***  0.428 0.000 ***  0.427 0.000 ***  0.422 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.000 0.962   -0.000 0.948       0.000 0.809       -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.026 0.147   0.024 0.167   0.026 0.147           0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.062 0.017 **  -0.063 0.017 **  -0.062 0.017 **  -0.062 0.017 **  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.024 0.001 ***  0.024 0.001 ***  0.024 0.001 ***  0.024 0.001 ***  0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     0.180 0.302                  
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.359  0.359  0.359  0.358  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.346  0.346  0.347  0.346  0.614  0.424 
N 885  885  885  885  136  499 
 
Notes: 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel C2: Pension Contributions of Individual Director 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.610 0.000 ***  -0.610 0.000 ***  -0.610 0.000 ***  -0.613 0.000 ***  -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  -0.347 0.000 ***  -0.466 0.001 ***  -0.347 0.000 ***  -0.349 0.000 ***  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.323 0.000 ***  0.324 0.000 ***  0.323 0.000 ***  0.319 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity 0.000 0.648   0.000 0.660       0.000 0.288       -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.027 0.003 ***  0.026 0.005 ***  0.027 0.003 ***          0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.027 0.023 **  -0.027 0.021 **  -0.027 0.023 **  -0.027 0.023 **  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.011 0.022 **  0.011 0.019 **  0.011 0.022 **  0.011 0.021 **  0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     0.146 0.357                  
Family Member 0.021 0.680   0.016 0.749   0.021 0.679   0.024 0.633          
Chairman -0.042 0.511   -0.039 0.543   -0.042 0.511   -0.042 0.508          
CEO 0.302 0.000 ***  0.303 0.000 ***  0.302 0.000 ***  0.301 0.000 ***         
INED -1.162 0.000 ***  -1.163 0.000 ***  -1.162 0.000 ***  -1.137 0.000 ***         
RC -0.089 0.131   -0.089 0.129   -0.089 0.131   -0.085 0.146          
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.285  0.285  0.285  0.283  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.279  0.279  0.279  0.278  0.614  0.424 
N 2738  2738  2738  2738  491  3625 
Notes: White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel D1: Bonuses of All Directors 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.787 0.158   -0.788 0.157   -0.787 0.153   -0.785 0.159   -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  0.305 0.058 *  0.475 0.127   0.342 0.031 **  0.304 0.058 *  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.577 0.000 ***  0.576 0.000 ***  0.591 0.000 ***  0.577 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity 0.399 0.127   0.423 0.112       0.402 0.125       -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.010 0.785   0.009 0.797   0.014 0.699           0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.134 0.000 ***  -0.134 0.000 ***  -0.134 0.000 ***  -0.134 0.000 ***  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage -0.005 0.606   -0.006 0.526   0.004 0.559   -0.005 0.600   0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     -0.204 0.542                  
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.363  0.363  0.359  0.363  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.338  0.337  0.336  0.339  0.614  0.424 
N 453  453  453  453  136  499 
 
Notes: 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel D2: Bonuses of Individual Director 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC 0.071 0.814   0.083 0.783   0.082 0.784   0.072 0.812   -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  0.126 0.184   0.227 0.295   0.174 0.066 *  0.126 0.185   -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.499 0.000 ***  0.499 0.000 ***  0.518 0.000 ***  0.498 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity 0.626 0.001 ***  0.638 0.001 ***      0.633 0.001 ***      -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.012 0.586   0.011 0.603   0.025 0.256           0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.144 0.000 ***  -0.143 0.000 ***  -0.142 0.000 ***  -0.142 0.000 ***  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage -0.022 0.196   -0.023 0.183   -0.007 0.679   -0.022 0.191   0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     -0.119 0.603                  
Family Member -0.096 0.259   -0.093 0.279   -0.090 0.295   -0.097 0.255          
Chairman 0.613 0.000 ***  0.609 0.000 ***  0.593 0.000 ***  0.614 0.000 ***         
CEO 0.679 0.000 ***  0.677 0.000 ***  0.667 0.000 ***  0.678 0.000 ***         
INED -0.414 0.109   -0.435 0.096 *  -0.503 0.042 **  -0.402 0.118          
RC 0.289 0.003 ***  0.292 0.003 ***  0.294 0.003 ***  0.290 0.003 ***         
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.360  0.360  0.354  0.360  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.350  0.350  0.344  0.351  0.614  0.424 
N 1488  1488  1488  1488  136  499 
Notes: White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel E1: Share-based Paid of All Directors 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC 1.736 0.010 **  1.728 0.011 **  1.728 0.010 **  1.787 0.008 ***  -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  -0.435 0.086 *  -0.641 0.252   -0.433 0.087 *  -0.423 0.097 *  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.167 0.011 **  0.168 0.011 **  0.167 0.011 **  0.133 0.044 **  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity 0.017 0.155   0.017 0.154       0.013 0.312       -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.121 0.019 **  0.119 0.021 **  0.120 0.019 **          0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth 0.035 0.058 *  0.034 0.082 *  0.035 0.060 *  0.033 0.071 *  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.002 0.897   0.003 0.814   0.002 0.848   0.000 0.979   0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     0.261 0.657                  
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.232  0.233  0.232  0.213  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.184  0.182  0.187  0.167  0.614  0.424 
N 292  292  292  292     
 
Notes: 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel E2: Share-based Paid of Individual Director 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC 1.608 0.000 ***  1.600 0.000 ***  1.597 0.000 ***  1.634 0.000 ***  -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  -0.509 0.000 ***  -0.896 0.001 ***  -0.502 0.000 ***  -0.514 0.000 ***  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.123 0.000 ***  0.126 0.000 ***  0.125 0.000 ***  0.111 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity 0.044 0.011 **  0.043 0.009 ***      0.044 0.016 **      -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.046 0.070 *  0.041 0.105   0.046 0.072 *          0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth 0.044 0.003 ***  0.042 0.004 ***  0.043 0.003 ***  0.044 0.002 ***  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage -0.001 0.931   0.001 0.911   0.000 0.962   -0.001 0.936   0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     0.474 0.108                  
Family Member -0.156 0.267   -0.172 0.221   -0.158 0.260   -0.153 0.275          
Chairman 0.265 0.130   0.285 0.104   0.263 0.132   0.271 0.123          
CEO 0.599 0.000 ***  0.599 0.000 ***  0.598 0.000 ***  0.597 0.000 ***         
INED -1.161 0.000 ***  -1.169 0.000 ***  -1.164 0.000 ***  -1.166 0.000 ***         
RC 0.167 0.197   0.166 0.202   0.164 0.206   0.171 0.187          
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.325  0.326  0.324  0.323  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.310  0.311  0.310  0.309  0.614  0.424 
N 1051  1051  1051  1051     
Notes: White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel F1: Total Remuneration of All Directors 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC -0.357 0.087 *  -0.357 0.087 *  -0.357 0.087 *  -0.354 0.089 *  -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  0.200 0.015 **  0.189 0.245   0.200 0.015 **  0.198 0.015 **  -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.375 0.000 ***  0.375 0.000 ***  0.375 0.000 ***  0.375 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity 0.000 0.745   0.000 0.747       0.000 0.733       -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.000 0.078 *  0.000 0.185   0.000 0.077 *          0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth -0.021 0.000 ***  -0.021 0.000 ***  -0.021 0.000 ***  -0.021 0.000 ***  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.010 0.094 *  0.010 0.093 *  0.010 0.094 *  0.010 0.095 *  0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     0.014 0.937                  
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.432  0.432  0.432  0.432  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.422  0.421  0.423  0.423  0.614  0.424 
N 965  965  965  965     
 
Notes: 
White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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Panel F2: Total Remuneration of Individual Director 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value   Coeff P-value  
INED on RC 0.162 0.116   0.166 0.108   0.161 0.118   0.167 0.106   -0.138 0.886   -0.388 0.724  
Family Head  0.054 0.200   0.221 0.006 ***  0.054 0.197   0.052 0.215   -0.141 0.606   -0.189 0.570  
Log Sales 0.225 0.000 ***  0.224 0.000 ***  0.225 0.000 ***  0.225 0.000 ***  0.304 0.000 ***  0.368 0.000 *** 
Return On Equity -0.001 0.003 ***  -0.001 0.004 ***      -0.001 0.004 ***      -0.147 0.687  
Stock Return 0.001 0.050 **  0.001 0.010 **  0.001 0.051 *          0.252 0.337  
Sales Growth 0.006 0.046 **  0.007 0.043 **  0.006 0.046 **  0.006 0.046 **  -0.026 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.449  
Leverage 0.016 0.007 ***  0.015 0.008 ***  0.016 0.007 ***  0.016 0.007 ***  0.021 0.000 ***  0.027 0.039 ** 
Group     -0.215 0.015 **                 
Family Member 0.147 0.005 ***  0.157 0.003 ***  0.147 0.005 ***  0.148 0.005 ***         
Chairman 0.504 0.000 ***  0.501 0.000 ***  0.504 0.000 ***  0.504 0.000 ***         
CEO 1.263 0.000 ***  1.259 0.000 ***  1.263 0.000 ***  1.263 0.000 ***         
INED -1.621 0.000 ***  -1.618 0.000 ***  -1.621 0.000 ***  -1.620 0.000 ***         
RC 0.116 0.003 ***  0.116 0.003 ***  0.116 0.003 ***  0.116 0.003 ***         
Industry dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
Year dummies Included  Included  Included  Included  Included  Excluded 
R-squared 0.453  0.453  0.452  0.452  0.671  0.490 
Adjusted R-squared 0.451  0.451  0.451  0.451  0.614  0.424 
N 7055  7055  7055  7055     
Notes: White-corrected standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
*, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively in a two-tail test.
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